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Abstract 
The extent to which Korea has become a fully-fledged neoliberal state has been subject to debate. 
We argue that the recent rise and fall of shareholder activism in Korea is related to the coexistence 
of neoliberal and developmental state characteristics. Uncertainty as to “the rules of the game” 
during this uneven transition has provided the chaebol with an opportunity to defuse the radical 
potential of shareholder activism. Through an analysis of media reports this article argues there is a 
relationship between the rise of fall shareholder activism in Korea and a retreat from neoliberalism. 
It then discusses advantages of the theory of Modes of Exchange to make sense of these 
developments. 
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Introduction 
In South Korea, the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2007-08 Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC) unleashed forces that have driven a significant shift in the structures 
and practices associated with the developmental state. Externally, global capital is 
pressuring Korea to acquire more neoliberal characteristics. Internally, civic groups 
have adopted innovative forms of NGO-driven shareholder activism to realize 
corporate governance reform. This has created challenges for Korea's large 
conglomerates, the chaebol, as they seek to maintain their dominance in the Korean 
economy and pass on family ownership of their corporate empires to their heirs. 
Nevertheless, the chaebol have been relatively adroit in dealing with these external 
pressures and particularly effective in defusing the radical potential of Korea’s 
minority shareholder movement (MSM). We argue that this is part of a broader 
process of maintaining developmental state characteristics in an era of neoliberal 
globalization through attempting to reduce once leftist inspired notions of 
“economic democracy” to the task of corporate governance reform (Doucette 
2015).  This article explains the sources of the chaebol’s legitimacy problem in 
Korean society with reference to their distinct structure and governance 
arrangements. Afterwards, we analyse contemporary Korean media coverage and 
argue that the rise and decline of the MSM is related to a selective and uneven 
engagement with the neoliberal agenda. The paper concludes by examining the 
explanatory advantages of the theories of New Institutionalism and Modes of 
Exchange to make sense of these developments. 
 
Literature Review: The rise of the Korean Chaebol 
During an extended period of authoritarian rule and extensive state intervention in 
the economy, economic elites emerged in Korea that became closely connected to 
the central political authority as a way of maintaining their privileged position. The 
relationship between political and economic elites was largely based on the 
exchange of political donations and support in return for market privileges. During 
this period, the South Korean government channelled massive amounts of capital 
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through subsidies and low-interest-rate loans into trusted chaebols. These favoured 
firms also enjoyed trade preferences and monopoly rights, among other indulgences 
extended by Korea’s political elites (Oh and Varcin 2009). 
 
Such preferential treatment enabled the chaebol to grow into massive business 
empires. But this government support came at a price. State bureaucrats were 
willing to provide this largesse including business permits or legal protection only 
if businesses or business owners remitted extracted payments to the former (Oh and 
Varcin 2009).  
 
However, as Korea has become highly exposed to the interconnected global 
economy, various features associated with more open and entrepreneurial markets 
have emerged. The fallout from two major financial crises, the Asian Financial 
Crisis in 1997-98 and the Global Financial Crisis in 2007-2008 exposed a weak, 
badly regulated financial system; wildly overleveraged firms; and occasionally 
corrupt corporate governance practices. These practices and other distinctive structural 
features have undermined the legitimacy of the chaebol in Korean society (Lim 2003). 
 
A legitimacy problem: the chaebol’s distinctive structural and governance 
characteristics  
The large conglomerate business group is not unique to Korea however several 
features distinguish Korean chaebols from conglomerates in other countries.  
One distinctive characteristic is the extent to which chaebols have diversified their 
field of operations. The breadth of chaebols’ operations is partly a by-product of a 
capital-raising strategy. For many decades, new firms could more easily obtain low-
interest-rate loans from the Korean government-controlled banks (Lee 1999).  So in 
spite of the government’s so-called ‘specialization policy’ introduced in 1991 to 
induce the chaebol to concentrate their investment resources into their core 
businesses, by the late 1990s, leading chaebols, such as Samsung, Hyundai, LG, 
and Daewoo, each had over 80 affiliated companies participating in a wide range of 
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industries, including consumer electronics, semiconductors, construction, 
automobiles, trading, shipbuilding and financial services (Kim, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, 
Hong 2004). While the 1997 Asian financial crisis precipitated the re-structure and, 
in some cases, their collapse, Daewoo being a famous example, most survived and 
continued to expand (Bremner and Moon, 2002). 
A second notable feature of the chaebol is the extent to which they dominate the 
Korean economy. In 2010, according to the federation of Korean industry, the 
largest 30 chaebol accounted for 84 per cent of total exports (Bloomberg 2012). 
They also account for most of the Korean stock market’s market capitalisation. For 
instance, the Samsung Group’s capitalisation to total market capitalisation ratio 
equalled about 21 percent in 2006 (Lim 2011).  
A third distinctive feature of the chaebol is the extent of discretionary power of 
owner managers given that they own only a small proportion of shares. The source 
of owner-managers’ discretionary power is through their control of the chaebol core 
or mother company, which in essence is a "control tower" system of group-wide 
oversight. In a study by Korea’s Fair Trade Commission released in 2015, family 
ownership of stock at 41 groups with a family “chongsu” (an unofficial or 
unappointed general manager who makes the final corporate decisions for the entire 
syndicate) was found to be just 4.3% with 55.2% of the remaining internal equity 
owned by affiliates and executives (FTC 2015). The internal equity ownership rate 
for Samsung, Hyundai, SK, LG, and other conglomerates in the top ten rose from 
46.4% to 53.6% in 2001, while ownership for the controlling family actually 
dropped from 3.1% to 2.7% (FTC 2015). Chaebols are thus a variant of the 
controlling minority structure firm, where a shareholder exercises control while 
retaining only a small fraction of the equity claims on a company's cash flows (Lee 
2002; Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis 1999; Chang 2003).  
The controlling minority structure has allowed owners to transfer stock, capital and 
managerial resources among the chaebol group’s affiliated firms often to prop up 
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weaker affiliates (Lee 2000). One common intragroup transaction is awarding 
contracts to firms owned by family members, a practice known as tunneling (Bae et 
al 2008; Lim 2011; Nam, Kang and Kim. 1999; Choi, Lee, and Park 2007). 
Outsider shareholders suffer from this form of internal trading among chaebol 
affiliates as firms buy products at over-inflated prices from sister companies even 
when non-affiliated firms offer better rates.   
In this way chaebol governance arrangements have effectively insulated owners 
from the demands of shareholders or outside directors (Choi, Park and Yoo 2007). 
There are various indicators that highlight the weakness of chaebol minority 
shareholders. One is the large price gap between the common stocks and preferred 
stocks of Korean firms. The price of common stocks in Korea is often twice as high 
as that of preferred stocks in Korea (Baek, Kang and Park 2004). Another measure 
of shareholder rights is the amount paid to shareholders in the form of dividends. In 
the Korean chaebols the ratio of dividend rates relative to profits is typically around 
20 percent compared to about 40 percent in the US and Japan (Lee 2002).  
Anti-chaebol sentiment has been further fuelled by the chaebol owners’ 
commitment to dynastic practices. In recent years there have been numerous battles 
over management rights and inheritances among chaebol families attempting to use 
a range of unconventional and often illegal methods from tunnelling to intra- firm 
real estate transactions to bypass Korea’s hefty 50% inheritance taxes. These battles 
have sparked a great deal of infighting among chaebol families themselves which in 
turn has heightened public resentment (Hwang and Kim 2014). 
In the wake of the financial crisis, progress regarding chaebol corporate governance 
has been made with the Korean government strengthening the hand of minority 
shareholders by pressing the chaebol to remove mutual debt guarantees, cross-
shareholdings and other financial ties between affiliates (WSJ 2003). But in most of 
the family controlled chaebol there is still little shareholders can do to influence 
management decisions.i  
 
 
Page 6 of 42 
 
Due to the Korean conglomerates collusion with the state; its economic dominance 
of the economy; its failure to recognise shareholder rights, and its dynastic 
practices, the chaebol have a legitimacy problem in Korean society (Lim 2003).  
However for decades the state did little to directly respond to this sentiment and 
instead emphasized how the chaebol was an instrument of the social goal of 
national prosperity (Roh 2007). But the fall out after the Asian Financial Crisis had 
devastating economic and social consequences and took the reputation of the 
chaebol to rock bottom.  
 
In the late 1990s unemployment soared (reaching 6.8% in 1999); real wages 
steadily decreased (from 100 in 1997 to 98.1 in 2001); and casualisation of the 
workforce rose sharply (Shin, 2013). Together these factors led to unprecedented 
levels of income inequality, Park and Mah show how the Gini coefficient increased 
from 0.27 in 1997 to 0.31 in 1998 (Pak and Mah 2011). While, as Pirie argues, the 
cause of the GFC was externalised, the ongoing social hardship was seen to be the 
fault of the chaebol (Bloomberg 2012).   
 
In response, the “chaebol problem” became the dominant issue in the 2012 
presidential elections. This focus of the chaebol marks a departure from former 
elections which focussed on growth-first policies (Doucette 2015). Under the 
banner of “economic democratisation”, both liberal and conservative parties placed 
welfare and economic democratisation through chaebol reform at the centre of their 
platforms. As Doucette (2015) argues, the focus led to a series of heated exchanges 
about the vision of economic democratisation being promoted: 
with one camp favouring the creation of a “fair market” through the 
restructuring of the chaebol and another promoting the protection of the 
chaebol’s management rights over their affiliates as a desirable strategy for 
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The use of the term “economic democracy” among political parties was long 
predated by Korea’s progressive civil society organisations, which expanded 
rapidly following the transition to free elections in 1987. However, unlike the leftist 
anti-hegemonic ideology of labour and student based movements active during the 
decades of authoritarian rule (Koo 1993), for the post-democratisation breed of 
civic organisations, economic democracy came to be synonymous with chaebol 
governance reform. This was the case for two organisations in particular - the 
Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) and the People’s Solidarity for 
Participatory Democracy (PSPD). 
 
In the 1990s the CCEJ was the largest and best known of South Korea’s anti-
corruption NGOs and was widely considered to represent the new simin undong 
tanch’e [citizens’ movement groups]. Its demands for “economic justice” centred 
on condemning the corrupt state-business relationship and an inadequate financial 
and tax system for triggering a host of economic and social problems. The PSPD 
was established in September 1994 initially led by Park Won-soon, a lawyer known 
for work representing dissidents and “comfort women” (women who were forced to 
serve as sex slaves for the Japanese imperial army in the 1940s). The stated goal of 
the PSPD was to “prevent the abuse of power by government, the judiciary and big 
business groups via the participation of citizens” (Park 2010).  It committed to a 
variety of issues - from compiling files on judicial officials and their verdicts, 
monitoring parliamentary activities and conducting its “Transparent Society 
Campaign” (Kim 2003). More recently it has been the PSPD’s focus on the issue of 
shareholder rights under the banner of the Minority Shareholders Movement 
(MSM) that has attracted the most public attention.  
 
The CCEJ and PSPD are broadly representative of the main type of NGO that 
emerged in the 1990s in that they adopted a social justice agenda; were urban-
based; formed various linkages with other NGOs while remaining relatively 
independent from organised labour and political parties, and explicitly adopted 
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legal and non-violent tactics centring on the development and mobilisation of 
organised popular opinion (Dalton and Cotton 1996). Also both groups drew their 
members overwhelmingly from Korea’s influential middle-class.ii After the 1997 
crisis the CCEJ declined (and as Lim and Jang (2007) point out, many of its leading 
members took important positions in the government’s economic ministries). 
However the PSPD remains active. 
 
 
Theory: Framing, New Institutionalism and Modes of Exchange 
 
The configuration of forces in Korea’s political environment favoured the 
emergence of these types of citizen based movements. For Korea’s Minority 
Shareholder Movement (MSM) the unresponsiveness of the government to chaebol 
excesses; the presence of supporting forces (in particular foreign capital seeking to 
invest in Korea) and the power configuration in the political society together 
created the political opportunity structure conducive to its formation and capacity to 
garner public support (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1989; Brockett 1991). The political 
opportunity structure also suited MSM’s adoption of more moderate strategies as 
they were in keeping with the orientation and organisational skills of their 
middleclass support base.  Most importantly, however, was the availability and 
extension of new frames of meaning. Through actively engaging in the social 
construction of new meanings of economic democracy it created a new frame – that 
is a new construction of a shared interpretation of a problem (Snow and Benford 
1988). This frame was linked to a variety of existing grievances with the chaebol 
through the language of corporate governance reform. To achieve this the MSM 
was particularly effective in using the mass media to extend this frame and  
garner wider public support (Kim and Park 2008).   
 
For this reason theories relating to framing through the mass media are particularly 
relevant to the case of shareholder activism in Korea. ‘Framing’ is now an 
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established field in mass communication studies. Entman (1993: 52) argues that the 
purpose of framing, ‘is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them 
more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described’. Similarly, Gitlin (1980: 7) defines media 
frames as ‘persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation of 
selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organise 
discourse, whether verbal or visual.’ The pervasiveness of a particular frame can be 
demonstrated through an examination of the most commonly used metaphors in the 
media coverage of a particular issue. Vujakovic (1998, 153) points to metaphors as 
having social power, noting that ‘[t]he common acceptance of a particular metaphor 
(propagated or reinforced by the media) may lead to a limited view of an issue and 
the closure of constructive alternatives’. Theories relating to framing thus provide 
the theoretical foundation for the methodology of media content analysis used in 
this study. 
 
The theories of new-institutionalism and MOE (Lie 1992; 1997) can also help us 
make sense of the rise and fall of shareholder activism in Korea. 
 
Various scholars have sought to bring together the fields of sociology and 
economics to develop sociological understandings of the market.  A group now 
known as New Institutionalists developed a theory that focuses on developing a 
sociological view of institutions — the way they interact and the way they affect 
society (DiMaggio and Powell's 2012; North 1981, 1990 Scott 2001; Brinton and 
Nee 1998). In a similar vein John Lie developed the sociological approach to the 
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As will be discussed, New Institutionalism and MOE theory help to understand the 
emergence and outcomes of the MSM have been shaped by dominant social 
relations and the current coexistence of mixed modes of exchange. 
 
Research Questions 
Both New Institutionalism and MOE theory illuminate various dynamics related to 
shareholder activism in Korea. In particular it can give greater insights into 
answering the following questions: 
a) How can we explain the rise of shareholder activism in Korea?  
b) What was the process of gathering the ethical and moral support from the 
populace to obtain legitimacy for MSM? Specifically, how did the MSM manage to 
re-frame what is considered “good” corporate governance in Korea. 
d) How did the state or institutional owners, including chaebol families, try to 
neutralize shareholder activism in Korea? What was the role of the media in this 
process? 




The Rise of Shareholder Activism in Korea 
Various scholars highlight the role shareholder activism can play in controlling 
corruption and promoting good governance (Iskander, Meyerman, Gray and Hagan, 
1999; Spar, and La Mure 2003; Proffitt, and Spicer 2006). Shareholder activism can 
take many forms, such as proxy battles or shareholder resolutions put to the vote at 
annual general meetings.  
 
However, in Korea, a lack of investor protection and almost non-existent 
shareholder rights have made these traditional methods of shareholder activism 
relatively impotent. Instead, shareholder activism adopted different strategies and 
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was led almost exclusively by the nongovernmental organisations (NGO) (Park and 
Kim 2008).  
 
The beginnings of the minority shareholders’ movement (MSM) in Korea can be 
traced back to March of 1997, after the Asian financial crisis (Park and Kim 2008). 
At that time, the economic committee of the PSPD, the Participatory Economy 
Committee (PEC), spearheaded by Professor Jang Hasung of Korea University, 
launched the “Minority Shareholders’ Movement (MSM)” which aimed to 
“scrutinize the internal operations of top chaebol in search of malpractices” (PSPD 
2015; Park and Kim 2008; Choi, and Cho 2003; Kim, and Kim 2001; Jang and Kim 
2002).  
 
In terms of methods, the PSPD-backed PEC focussed on using the court system and 
class actions. These strategies included a repertoire of non-violent protest and 
lobbying methods such as petitioning, staging public debates, pamphlet distribution 
and monitoring committees. These methods have been described by Han-Kyun Roh 
as “legalistic pragmatism” (Roh 2007). As one PEC officer interviewed by Roh 
recalled:  
We looked for a way of dealing with real-life companies. The answer was 
to become an [legally] interested party to the company, like shareholders, 
consumers and employees. (Interview on 11 October 1999 cited in Roh 
2007, 66)  
 
During the period from 1997 to 2001, the PEC filed 12 lawsuits, including 4 
derivative suits. A major success was in March 1998 when it won a legal case 
against Korea First Bank's management board, which resulted in the court ordering 
the bank management to pay 40 billion won in fines for managerial failures. 
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perhaps the most representative case of Korea’s citizen-based activism in 
the field of economic reform following the 1997 financial crisis.... [this is] 
evidence that NGOs have arrived as main actors in the process of 
reforming corporate governance in Korea.” (Park and Kim 2008, 60). 
 
As the MSM matured it developed another innovative approach to shareholder 
activism, partnering with foreign investors who sought to leverage their position as 
shareholders to push for reform from within. 
 
In 2006, and partly due to internal divisions regarding a change of focus from 
minority shareholders’ rights to institutional investment as a means to reform, the 
Participatory Economy Committee (PEC) separated from PSPD and took on the 
new name Solidarity for Economic Reform (Hankyoreh 21, 2006).  Jang Hasung 
also established the investment Korea Corporate Governance Fund (KCGF), under 
the management of Lazard Asset Management LLC, a New York-based asset 
manager. (In Korea the fund was commonly known as the Jang Hasung Fund). This 
fund then began to invest in a series of Korean companies judged to be undervalued 
due to poor governance practices. After becoming a shareholder, the fund then 
sought to actively address those governance problems, pressuring them to add 
outside directors and an audit committee, and then selling the shares after their 
proposals were adopted (Forbes Asia 2014). 
 
A 2007 study showed that the stock prices of companies targeted by KCGF 
increased significantly on the announcement of the targeting (Kim E. Han and Kim 
2008). For example, in August 2006 when the KCGF announced that it was buying 
5% of Dae-Han Synthetic Fiber, within one month the company’s stock price rose 
by over 200% (Kim and Kim 2008, 10).   
 
In this way, local civic-based activists aligned with foreign investors managed to 
put pressure on the chaebol to realise some corporate governance reform while also 
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turning a profit. However this financial success, particularly as it was in part 
achieved through to working with foreign investors, lead many to wonder if the 
MSM had begun to be more motivated by profit rather than shareholder rights. 
 
The decline of shareholder activism and the uneven uptake of neoliberalism in 
Korea 
In the early stages, the MSM was welcomed among the public. One reason was that 
it was relatively successful. Research by Choi and Cho shows that, of the 24 cases 
launched by MSM, 13 won their lawsuit or secured a majority vote for their 
proposals at various shareholders' meetings (Choi and Cho 2003). The MSM also 
won three of its eight general lawsuits and five of its eleven shareholder proposals 
were adopted (Choi and Cho 2003).   
 
Leadership also played a role. Jang Hasung was celebrated as a popular and 
respected activist figure. In 1998 and 1999 Jang was included in Business Week’s 
50 Asian Stars for being one of Asia’s best advocates of shareholders’ rights and 
received one of the first International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) 
Annual Awards in 2001 (Business Week 1998; 1999).  
 
MSM also had appeal as it aligned with generally positive views of civil society 
organisations. Many Koreans are proud of the critical role civil society 
organisations played in driving Korea’s democratisation. As Lim and Jang argue 
“As major legitimacy-bearers and legitimacy-producers in post-democratic South 
Korea, NGOs were considered public watchdogs representing or embodying a just 
civil society” (Lim and Jang 2006, 459).  
 
More fundamentally the movement benefitted from the political opportunity 
structure and framing of their issue in a way that tapped into middleclass values and 
strong anti-chaebol sentiment. The MSM social construction of economic 
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democracy had “frame resonance” in that it was relevant to existing popular 
understandings (Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford 1986). 
 
Over time, however, the movement lost much of its popular support. Some scholars 
argue that its decline was related to the growing hegemony of neoliberalism in 
Korea (Lim and Jang 2006; Kim and Park 2008).  This is related to a general 
consensus that in recent years Korea has experienced a pronounced shift toward the 
neoliberal model (Hall, 2003; Kim, 1999; Ha and Lee, 2007; Hundt, 2005; Lee, 
2006). As Lee and Kwak’s (2009) review of the literature points out, these authors 
refer to three types of evidence - the establishment of an independent financial 
regulator; the dramatic increase in foreign ownership of financial institutions (by 
2003 foreigners owned more than 34% of Korean shares by value, up from just 
13% at the end of 1996 WSJ 2003) and the segmentation policies for banking, 
securities, and trust activities - as evidence to support the view. It is argued that 
these reforms precipitated the institutional death of the Korean developmental state 
(Hundt, 2005; Lee, 2006).  
 
Lim and Jang (2006) explicitly link the rise of neoliberalism with the decline of the 
MSM.  They argue that due to the movement’s dependence on legalistic and 
technical discourses that emphasised shareholders' rights over the interests of other 
stakeholders, such as workers or other subaltern groups, the MSM contributed to 
the establishment of the core neoliberal principle - the inviolability of exclusive 
private ownership. They argue that the MSM’s approach provided neoliberalism 
with the “much needed political and moral legitimacy as a hegemonic project in the 
drastically changed environment that was South Korea after the 1997 crisis” (Lim 
and Jang 2006, 451).   
 
However, some question the neoliberal convergence thesis as it applies to Korea 
(Lee and Kwak 2009; Pirie 2015). Pirie (2015) argues that there was a selective 
retreat from neoliberalism post the GFC. This retreat was related to various groups 
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in Korea including the government constructing the GFC as a failure of a global, 
Western-dominated financial system (Pirie 2015). This construction of the GFC as 
an exogenous threat is relevant to how shareholder activism came to be viewed as 
an agent of hostile foreign interests. A media content analysis shows how such 
sentiments became evident during the attempts of a Monaco-based investment fund, 
Sovereign Asset Management Ltd, to take control of South Korea's largest oil 
refiner, SK Corp.  
 
In 2003, when the stock of SK Corp. plummeted after news broke of a multibillion-
dollar accounting scandal at an affiliated company, Sovereign bought nearly 15% of 
SK Corp. Shares. Sovereign argued that bad corporate governance under the 
leadership of the family chongsu Chairman Chey Tae-won dented the value of SK 
Corp. and that its stock would rise if they removed Chey. At one stage this looked 
possible as Chey was jailed on charges of fraud. However, in August 2003 Chey 
was released on bail and then successfully secured the backing of local banks to 
support him in the March 2004 shareholders meeting where shareholders voted 
against Sovereign’s attempt to oust the company's board. In 2005, Sovereign Asset 
Management's sold its investment in SK Corp at a $700 million profit. At the time 
of writing, the Chey family still control SK Corp. and Chey Tae-won was reported 
to have been the most highly paid among Korea’s corporate CEOs earning nearly 
$26 million in 2014 (Chosun Ilbo, 1 April 2014). 
 
 
Methodology: Media content analysis  
Through its interpretation of events, the media can influence the way an issue is 
discussed and evaluated and in this way influence individual perceptions (Gamson 
1988). The ways media frames a given event or issue is central in determining 
whether audience perceptions are largely positive or critical. This is because media 
frames tend to offer ‘moral judgment’ reflective of ‘specific ideology’, forwarded 
through the use of carefully selected words, metaphors and phrases, which set the 
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‘“tone” of media coverage’ (Saleem 2007, 134-5). Headlines are particularly 
influential. Steuter and Wills (2009, 9) argue that they play a significant role not 
only in communicating and encapsulating article content, but in ‘influenc[ing] and 
direct[ing]’ audience interpretation, perception and evaluation of the reported issue 
as a large proportion of a newspaper’s readership will form an understanding of 
reported topics based on a scanning of headlines, rather than a full reading of 
featuring articles (Steuter and Wills 2009, 13).  
 
Our analysis initially examined the headlines of reports on the SK Corp/Sovereign’ 
case in the Korea-based and international English language media to ascertain the 




To generate relevant headlines for analysis we sampled all English language 
articles sorted by relevance that appeared between 1 January 2003 to 1 January  
2004. The query used the general name for the companies, ‘SK Corp’, and 
‘Sovereign’. This process also allowed a large number of media articles to be 
reduced to a more manageable sample (Riffe et al. 2008). Then, using the same 
query, the search was conducted on all English language publications based in 
Korea. This second search generated 416 articles. The search included The Chosun 
Ilbo, Dong-A Ilbo, and Jung-Ang Ilbo which are conservative in orientation; the 
Hankook Ilbo and The Hankyoreh the major progressive newspapers and the two 
major business newspapers Maeil Business Newspaper and Korea Economic Daily. 
All of these newspapers publish English and vernacular versions of each issue. 
 
Coding operation 
To indentify the dominant metaphors used in the Korea-based media, coding was 
conducted to convert the raw data into a standardised form (Babbie 2003). There 
has not been any systematic research undertaken on media representations of the 
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Sovereign case so the coding categories were developed in an inductive and 
exploratory way. Coding categories of both manifest and latent content were 
created to balance out their respective shortcomings. The software package NVivo 
8 by QSR was used to code both types of content. 
 
The surface, or manifest, content categories are specific words. The manifest 
content was developed using the word frequency query available in NVivo 8, to 
gain an understanding of some of the common language used. Some 100 of the 




During the 2003-2004 Sovereign vrs SK episode there was a particularly sharp 
increase in foreign direct investment in Korea. Total notifications of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in 2004 amounted to US$12.77billion, up 97.4 percent on the 
US$6.46 billion from 2003. Merger and acquisition investments increased by 84.5 
percent over the 2003-2004 period. Major cases of FDI in 2004 included the 
takeover of Hanmi Bank by Citigroup of the United States for US$1.71 billion, the 
creation of the US$930-million joint venture firm of S-LCD by Samsung and Sony 
of Japan, and the takeover of Ssangyong Motors by Shanghai Automotive Industry 
Corp. After investing during this period some foreign investors exited and made 
substantial profits in the process. For example, in 2003, Dallas-based Lone Star 
Funds bought a controlling stake in Korea Exchange Bank and, after a decade long 
legal battle, won approval to sell the bank to Hana Financial Group in 2012 making 
$4 billion profit (Bloomberg 2012) ; in 2004 the U.K.-based fund Hermes 
Investment Management Ltd sold its shares in Samsung Corp. for about $100 
million profit; and in 2006 the Carl Ichan led US-based Icahn Partners' Master Fund 
successfully pressured tobacco firm KTandG Corp. to pay out $3 billion to its 
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During this period a narrative began to emerge in the Korean media that expressed 
unease with foreign investment. Headlines such as  the following dominated the 
major dailies: “Calls for Tightening M and A Rules Rejected (Korea Times, 7 April 
2004); “Barriers to hostile takeovers in Korea” (The Korea Herald, 2 July 2003); 
“KCCI urges better defence against hostile takeovers (The Korea Herald, 29 
October 2003; SK Safe From Foreign Hostile Takeover Bid (Korea Times, 16 April 
2003); and “Seoul to protect chaebol against hostile MandAs.” (The Korea Herald, 
23 April 2003). In the case of Soveriegn, headlines like “Don't try to know much 
about us” (The Korea Times, 22 December 2003) and “Non-Transparent Sovereign 
Fails to Win Hearts of Koreans” (The Korea Times, 16 March 2004) were typical of 
a growing distrust of Soveriegn’s intentions. In contrast reporting in the non-
Korean press often defended the rights of international investors. Table 1 compares 
the headlines of Korean and non-Korean press regarding Sovereign and SK Corp 
over the 24 month period January 2003 to January 2004. 
  
[Insert Table 1 here]. 
 
Figure 1 shows that a search of all Korean News Publications for articles with the 
words "Sovereign” and “SK Corp" from 1 January 2003 to 1 January 2006 
generated 416 articles. An analysis of these articles shows the frequency of the 
appearance of relatively negative descriptor terms regarding Sovereign’s actions. 
Based on the frequency of certain key words, the dominant metaphors identified a 
group of conflict metaphors including the terms “hostile”, “oust”, “takeover” and 
“battle”. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
These metaphors contribute to constructing ‘facts’ about foreign investors interests 
and motivations, in particular that their motives are not so much about Korean 
corporate governance reform but about making quick profits. It is noticeable that 
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this narrative was particularly strong in the conservative press. In February 2004 
Sovereign placed a series of full-page advertisements in leading newspapers. 
However, days later SK Corp retaliated paying for a number of colour 
advertisements in The Chosun Ilbo and Dongah Ilbo while Sovereign's agents said 
that these conservative dailies told them that there was no space available for their 
advertisements (The Economist 2004). Sovereign settled for a campaign on the 
internet, but this event shows that incumbent controlling Korean shareholders and 
high-level executives of major Chaebols effectively used their power over some 
parts of the media to counter the actions of Sovereign. 
 
In this context, representatives of the MSM voiced support for foreign investors. 
Head of the PSPD Economic Reform Center, Kim Sang-jo argued: 
A public backlash against overseas capital is not desirable. When takeover 
attempts are made, share prices of the targeted corporations rise in most 
cases. Increases in share prices indicate that external interference in corporate 
management is an effective means of enhancing corporate efficiency. Could 
the enhancement of efficiency be realized automatically without external 
interference? The answer is negative (Kim 2006).  
In another statement Kim Sang-jo said “Koreans should not condemn foreign 
investors' legal activities just because they profit from them” (JoongAng Daily, 17 
July 2005). 
 
The MSM’s defence of foreign investment has been a major driver behind the re-
evaluation of the movement. By lending its support to Sovereign’s campaign to 
transfer the ownership of the SK Corp from the Chey family, shareholder-activists 
were criticized for not condemning the perceived speculative characteristics of 
transnational finance. Instead headlines decried how the movement had become a 
vehicle for foreign capital to make quick profits at the expense of local interests. 
This headline from the Korea Herald that appeared in June 2008 sums up the mood: 
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“From Corporate Governance Champion to trojan horse of hostile takeovers: 
Corporate Governance turns a profit”. The article goes on:   
Was the fund about corporate governance reform or making money? The 
proposal was to do both unlocking shareholder value through generating 
corporate governance reform? It appeared to have failed in both. (The Korea 
Herald, 19 June 2008).  
 
In this way, many Koreans ongoing struggle surrounding the “nationality of 
capital” has implicated the shareholder rights movement. This reaction to the 
MSM’s connections with international capital is particularly interesting in the light 
of sociologist Park Gil Sung’s thesis that transnationalisation of the middle class 
has added a new dimension to the gap between social classes in Korea (Park, 2004).  
 
Discussion: The decline in support for Korea’s MSM and the retreat from 
Neoliberalism 
The decline in support for Korea’s MSM is emblematic of broader forces driving 
the construction of the Global Financial crisis as a failure of a global, Western-
dominated financial system and a consequent selective retreat from neoliberalism 
(Pirie 2015). This retreat that was made easier as both the chaebol and those in the 
MSM had only ever partially endorsed the neoliberal agenda.  
 
The chabeol was clearly in favour of privatisation, increased labour market 
flexibility and the tightening of market disciplines (Lee et al. 2010). However, the 
chaebol were less enthusiastic about the opening of key domestic markets, which 
they dominated, to foreign competition and the weakening of systems of industrial 
support from which they benefitted (Pirie 2015).  
 
The MSM endorsed pro-neoliberal inspired reforms to corporate governance but 
also accepted that the chaebol has a potentially complementary role in laying the 
basis for a broader social compromise that leads to the development of a Korean 
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welfare state (Doucette 2015). For example Kim Sang-jo, the director of Solidarity 
for Economic Reform and a leading minority shareholder activist, uses the phrase 
“fair market economy” to describe a process of establishing firm rules for the 
dispensation of justice concerning the questionable activities carried out by the 
chaebol and that the chaebol should be made to enter into the framework of social 
cooperation, producing economic democratisation (Kim 2012). Similarly, civic 
leader and political economist Lee Byeong-cheon (2012) advocates that chaebol 
reform is the gateway to a “symbiosis” in which independent businesses flourish in 
every corner of society and high-quality jobs increase.  
 
Unlike past interpretations of economic democracy, the MSM’s vision of economic 
democracy did not champion a redistribution of wealth. This is consistent with their 
middleclass origins. Despite the expression of liberal attitudes at certain points in 
Korean history, Korean scholars argue that overall the Korean middle-class is 
conservative and opportunistic in character and that middle-class support for the 
workers and students movement has always been conditional and selective (Choi 
1985; Dong 1993; Park 2004; Lee 2007). Civic leader and director of the 
Association for Economic Justice Jeong Seung-il describes this version of 
economic democracy as follows: 
the economic democratisation asserted by the minority shareholders’ 
campaign is merely wealth redistribution among some hundreds of 
thousands of stock market investors and some ten to twenty thousand 
American and British investors. The minority shareholders’ campaign has 
clearly reached some partial level of economic democratisation, but it has 
merely resulted in the even redistribution of wealth and property that was 
once monopolized by a privileged group of chaebol and top officials to... 
members of the upper class. Economic democratisation occurred, but it only 
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The relative explanatory power of the theories of new-institutionalism and 
Modes of Exchange (MOE) to understand the rise and fall of shareholder 
activism 
The theories of new-institutionalism and MOE (Lie 1992; 1997) can help us make 
sense of the rise and fall of shareholder activism in Korea. Both new-
institutionalism and MOE locate social actors in a network of personal relationships 
“characterised by certain norms, in accordance with which they evaluate - reward 
and punish - each other” (Brinton and Nee 1998, 40). Both theories thus help 
explain how Korea’s economic and political elites and shareholder activists 
embeddedness in dominant social relations shaped the emergence and outcomes of 
the movement. In particular, conditioning institutional factors shaped the structure 
of incentives open to middle class shareholder activists. The current foundering of 
shareholder activism underscores how shareholder activists themselves are 
embedded in these social relations. Due to their class location and the unstable 
character of middleclass interests they are particularly vulnerable to co-option by 
the state or business. As discussed many of the other main middle class NGO that 
emerged in the 1990s, the CCEJ’s,  many of its leaders have taken on jobs in 
government (Lim and Chang 2007). For these reasons the middle class-based MSM 
is more likely to become a force for moderation not democratisation, harnessing the 
energies of an ideologically malleable middle-class and preventing their alignment 
with more radical political alternatives (Paek 1993).  As Jang Hasung himself 
observed: "The chaebol have political power. The corporate sector has influence in 
every corner of society. There's no diversification.... Retired bureaucrats, judges, 
everyone wants a job in a chaebol" (quoted in Forbes Kirk 2014). 
 
The theory of Modes of Exchange (MOE) adds another heuristic dimension to 
understanding the rise and fall of Korean shareholder activism. MOE theory builds 
on new-institutionalism with its argument that the spread of ideas is only one 
precondition for system change. The modes of economic exchange also must 
change. But in Korea there has been no complete transition from one economic 
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mode or exchange to the other. In this context, Korea’s political and economic 
elites and civic groups absorbed neoliberalism only as a partially decontested 
package. Despite heated debate over what constitutes “economic democracy”, 
ultimately the prevailing vision of economic democracy is neither neoliberal or 
developmental in orientation but limited to a debate around different approaches to 
chaebol governance reform. As such economic democracy is focused on intra-class 
(among those with capital) as opposed to inter-class (labour and capital) relations 
(Doucette 2015). As the creator of MOE theory, John Lie, points out, any complete 
adoption of neoliberalism would require a transition from the current mixed market 
and entrepreneurial modes of exchange to a fully entrepreneurial mode, a transition 





Korea's rapid post-war economic development path was characterised by the 
emergence of a symbiotic relationship between government and businesses that was 
at the core of Korea's developmental state. This relationship shaped the emergence 
of uniquely Korean corporate structures and governance arrangements within South 
Korea's large conglomerates, the chaebol. However, as the Korean economy has 
globalised and democracy has matured, the country has become more exposed to 
exogenous economic shocks. The 1997 East Asian Crisis triggered the collapse of a 
string of chaebols and heightened pressure to reform their corporate governance 
arrangements in ways that promote greater transparency and accountability to 
shareholders. One NGO in particular, the People's Solidarity for Participatory 
Democracy (PSPD), took up the cause of minority shareholders initially through its 
adoption of legalistic methods.  
 
By the mid-1990s the focus of shareholder movement shifted emphasis away from 
minority shareholders’ rights to institutional investment as a means to reform. With 
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the backing of foreign investors, it attempted to use its leverage as a block 
shareholder to push for reform. However, since the well known Sovereign versus 
SK Corp case in 2003-2004, the popularity of the minority shareholder movement 
(MSM) has dwindled. Meanwhile the chaebol’s family ownership model not only 
remains intact but is in the process of inter-generational renewal. This suggests that 
pronouncements of the death of developmental state and the birth of a new 
neoliberal Korea are premature. 
 
MOE theory builds on new-institutionalism with its argument that the spread of 
ideas is only one precondition for system change. Any complete adoption of 
neoliberalism would require a transition from the current mixed market and 
entrepreneurial modes of exchange to a fully entrepreneurial mode, a transition that 
would need to be accompanied by intense inter-class confrontations (Lie 1992).  
 
As Park and Kim (2008) argue, while the minority shareholders’ movement gave 
birth to many new possibilities and hopes toward civil society in Korea, it 
ultimately foundered due to its legalistic and single-issue focused methods and in 
not providing a true alternative model for reform. This was due to an ultimately 
conservative and narrow definition of economy democracy as being synonymous 
with corporate governance reform. As civic leader Jeong Seung-il observes, “We 
originally wanted economic democracy. Yet what we gained was shareholder 
capitalism” (Jeong 2004, 373).
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Table 1: Comparison of headlines of Korean and non-Korean press regarding Sovereign and SK Corp. 
Timeline Non Korean media Korean media 
2003 
April 
April 10 Sovereign announces 
acquisition of 12.99% of SK Corp.  
April 14-16 Sovereign says it purchased 
SK Corp. shares to improve governance. 
Sovereign announces its total purchase of 
a 14.99% 
 
Investment fund to make bold reforms at SK Corp. Financial Times, 
14 April 2003 
Sovereign faces SK Corp probe. Financial Times, 16 April 2003 
Stakeholder Speaks Out To Koreans  The New York Times, 29 April 
2003  
 
SK Turtles Up in Face of Hostile Takeover, Chosun Ilbo, 15 April 2003 
Sovereign plans indirect influence on LG units  The Korea Herald, 22 
February 2005 
POSCO Favoured as White Knight for SK Corp. Korea Times, 16 April 
2003 
SK rules out hostile takeover by Crest. Maeil Business Newspaper, 15 April 
2003 
June-July 
June 15 SK Corp. board members 
approve debt-equity swap for its troubled 
trading unit, SK Global, (renamed SK 
Networks later in the year).  
 
Korea Corporate Reform Hits Snags - Fight by Chandler Brothers 
For SK Group Transparency Reflects Investor Obstacles. The Asian 
Wall Street Journal, 4 June 2003 
Sovereign threatens to block SK Global deal. Financial Times, 4 
June 2003 
Sk Global Bailout OK'd Amid Foreign Dissent, Dow Jones News 
Service, 18 June 2003 
Deja vu in South Korea, Institutional Investor - International, 1 July 
2003 
Purchase Of Shares Reignites Governance Debate In Korea, The 
New York Times, 24 July 2003 
 
SK Corp. shareholder tries to stymie debt-equity swap. JoongAng Daily, 11 
June 2003 
SK Braves Lawsuits to Rescue Trading Unit. Korea Times, 12 June 2003 
SK Group faces major governance reform. The Korea Herald, 17 June 2003 
Investors vote with their money against SK bailout. JoongAng Daily, 17 
June 2003  
Sovereign lashes out at Hana Bank president.  
JoongAng Daily, 9 June 2003 
SK, creditors unite to repel foreign investor's challenge. The Korea Herald, 
6 June 2003 
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 November- December 
Nov. 20 Sovereign says company will 
elect able managers at an annual 
shareholders meeting in March 2004  
Dec. 22  Sovereign files a court 
injunction against SK Corp. and its five 
top executives  
Dec. 23 Seoul District Court rejects 
Sovereign's injunction  
Sovereign fights in Korea to encourage change, Financial Times, 15 
December 2003 
Fund looks to challenge status quo in South Korea, Financial Times, 
15 December 2003 
Investor Suffers Setback in Fight With SK Corp. Korean Court 
Allows Sale Of Shares, The Wall Street Journal, 24 December 
2003 
Korean Oil Refiner Returns Fire In Battle with Big Shareholder. The 
Wall Street Journal, 16 November 2004. 
Sovereign Demands Changes on SK Board.  
Chosun Ilbo, 21 November 2003 
Foreigners Hold 44% of Shares of Top Groups.  
Chosun Ilbo, 27 October 2003  
'Don't try to know much about us'.  




Jan. 29 Sovereign announces five 
candidates for SK Corp.'s board of 
directors Jan. 30 SK Corp. announces 
corporate reform plan  
Feb. 22 SK Corp. announces 12 outside 
director candidates. SK Corp. board 
decides on resignation of three members, 
incl. SK group Chairman Son Kil-seung  
Feb. 25 Sovereign calls Chairman Chey 
to resign  
March 12. Chey  family succeeds in 
securing managerial rights at AGM 
South Korea's chaebol: A Sovereign remedy? Foreign investors take 
on big business  The Economist 26 Feb 2004  
Crusading brothers behind coup in Korea - Sovereign Asset 
Management, Financial Times, 8 March 2004 
Sovereign Asset to appeal SK Corp ruling. Financial Times, 22 
December 2004 
Sovereign puts $1bn into 'model chaebol' LG. Financial Times, 18 
February 2005 
Sovereign gives up plan to 'influence' SK Corp. Financial Times, 21 
June 2005 
Sovereign abandons its quest to oust Chey Tae-won - SK Corp. 
Financial Times, 22 June 2005 
SK Corp., Sovereign Able to Compromise, Professor Says Yonhap English 
News, 3 February 2004 
Sovereign, SK Corp. reach showdown - Monaco-based fund seeks control of 
leading oil refiner The Korea Herald, 11 March 2004 
SK-Sovereign Showdown Gets Global Attention  
Korea Times, 8 March 2004 
Non-Transparent Sovereign Fails to Win Hearts of Koreans, Korea Times, 
16 March 2004 
New rules to help firms ward off hostile takeovers  
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Figure 1: Korean News Publications* Search "Sovereign AND SK Corp"  from 1 
January 2003 to  1 January 2006 (n = 416) 
 






1 In a study carried out by the Korean Fair Trade Commission (FTC) of 238 
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raised in board meetings between May 2011 and April 2012 were not 
approved as proposed because of opposition from an external director 
(Hangyoreh Simun “Park government stepping back from proposed 
restrictions on chaebol” Aug.8, 2013). 
 
2 A 1994 survey of CCEJ members found that the majority were employed in 
the tertiary sector, with politicians, academics and medical, arts and 
culture, legal, small business, office and government workers   
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1 In a study carried out by the Korean Fair Trade Commission (FTC) of 238 
listed companies that are part of 46 chaebol, only 0.6% of 5,692 motions 
raised in board meetings between May 2011 to April 2012 weren’t 
approved as proposed because of opposition from an external director.   
(Hangyoreh Simun “Park government stepping back from proposed 
restrictions on chaebol” Aug.8, 2013). 
2 A 1994 survey of CCEJ members found that the majority were 
employed in the tertiary sector, with politicians, academics and medical, 
arts and culture, legal, small business, office and government workers 
accounting for 59.7% of the membership. Ministers of religion, members 
of social organisations, students and housewives accounted for a further 
26.4% of the membership.  Educational levels for members are also 
relatively high and in 1994, 63% were university graduates (CCEJ 1994: 
p.327). In the case of the PSPD’s shareholder activist arm the 
Participatory Economy Committee (PEC), by the end of 2000, its 22 
executives were either lawyers, accountants, academics or financial 
specialists (Roh 2007: 86). 
